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Abstract. This study identifies the impact of special agricultural safeguards (SSG) for 
the global meat market and for the Brazilian economy. The tariff lines subject to SSG 
were selected and the period of analysis was from 1995 to 2015. The value of additional 
tariff was calculated for each of the most important tariff lines, as well as, their impact 
on imports and Brazilian exports. The most important markets that applied SSGs were 
the U.S. for beef and European Union for poultry. For the additional tariffs that were 
estimated, the results indicated that the impact of the value of the meat not exported 
by Brazil to EU and the U.S. due to SSG tariff was equivalent to the loss of BRL 3.7 bil-
lion of the economy’s production value and almost BRL 2 billion of the Brazilian Gross 
Domestic Product.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA), concluded in 
1995, is an important benchmark in international trade. One of the most sig-
nificant results of the URAA was eliminating quantitative barriers, the so-
called import “quotas”, which were the most protectionist mechanisms used 
by developed countries against agricultural imports. In its place emerged the 
tariff quotas1 (defined by the TRQ acronym, from the English name “tariff 
rate quota”). However, very high extra-quota tariffs may also be prohibitive 
for trade and, hence, work in the same manner of the quantitative quotas 
that existed before 1995. In addition, another mechanism was implemented 
along with the tariff quotas, which did not previously exist and was intended 
to be transient, the so-called special safeguards, known by the SSG acronym 
(from the English name “special safeguards”).
1 In this mechanism the same product has two different tariffs: one that is lower, applicable up to 
a certain level of imports (in-quota) and another higher tariff, applicable when the imported vol-
ume exceeds the quota limit (extra-quota)
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The SSG consists in an additional tariff applied to 
the extra-quota tariff. However, unlike the extra-quota 
tariff, the additional SSG tariff is not a fixed value or 
percentage, but depends on certain conditions. There 
are two conditions in which it may occur: (i) when the 
import price is lower than a certain value (price trigger) 
or (ii) when the import volume is larger than a certain 
quantity (volume trigger). 
During the Doha Development round between 2002-
2006, the SSG mechanism did not receive any formal 
proposal for elimination or change. On the contrary, 
instead of eliminating or reforming this mechanism, 
what was proposed in that occasion and resumed in the 
discussions in the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Nairo-
bi, in 2015, was a similar mechanism, which would be 
adopted by the developing countries, called SSM (acro-
nym for the English name “Special Safeguard Mecha-
nisms”). Some studies about the SSG action carried out 
in a way to subsidize analysis for building the SSM are: 
Pal & Wadhwa, (2006); Aznal, (2007); Harris, (2008); 
Finger, (2009); Wolf, (2009) and Hertel et al. (2010). 
Among the studies developed with this purpose, 
only Harris (2008) made an in-depth analysis of the 
SSG. This author showed that the SSG, which should 
have been applied only during the implementation peri-
od of the Uruguay Round reforms, continued in use as 
a permanent mechanism. By analyzing the notifications 
of SSG in the period from 1995 to 2002 or 2007, depend-
ing on the existence of the notifications, this author 
verified that the most affected products were meat, dairy 
and sugar. The countries with highest use of such instru-
ment for these products were the European Union (EU) 
and the United States (US), and they used the price-
based mechanism (price SSG). Japan also presents a high 
application of the latter, but to a larger set of products 
and making use mainly of volume-based SSG. Harris 
(2008) also includes in his study some criticism to the 
values indicated for the triggers, in particular related to 
the reference price. These triggers were fixed by the aver-
age values observed in the period 1986-88 and never 
updated. At that period, the level of agriculture prices 
was relatively high. He adds that it would be of no use 
to cut the extra quota tariffs if this mechanism was not 
reviewed, since the additional SSG tariff could become 
more prominent and restrict trade in the same fashion. 
The main difference that distinguishes the special 
agriculture safeguards (SSG and the SSM proposal) of 
the general safeguards is the fact that the former is auto-
matic, while imposing the latter depends on proof of the 
damage. As they are automatic and, therefore, exempt 
from any damage-proving criterion, the agriculture safe-
guards may be applied without any justification.
A specific analysis of the SSG impact was carried out 
by Costa et al. (2015). These authors estimated that the 
impact of their use in the period from 1995 to 2013 over 
sugar exports in the US and EU was equivalent to a reduc-
tion in Brazilian sugar exports of 8 million tons of sugar 
(approximately 7 million not imported by the EU and 1 
million by the U.S.) The authors also estimated that, if 
these exports had occurred, Brazil could have gained, in 
that period, approximately BRL 42 billion in production 
value for the entire economy, considering the direct, indi-
rect and income effect impacts. As alerted by Harris (2008), 
the price triggers for sugar (average values observed in the 
period 1986-88) presented very high price levels, causing a 
practically constant application of the mechanism.
This study has the objective of a similar analysis to 
that made by Costa et al. (2015) but adjusted to anoth-
er important group of agriculture products: meats. The 
next section (section 2) shows the behavior of interna-
tional meat trade and the importance of Brazil in this 
market. Section 3 describes the methods and data used 
with the objective of identifying the impact of the addi-
tional SSG tariff and, in section 4, the empirical esti-
mates of its usage impacts in the meat markets were 
analyzed. Finally, section 5 concludes the analyses and 
results presented. 
2. THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE OF MEAT
According to OECD-FAO data (2015) on all global 
meat consumption, the share of beef, pork and poul-
try represents 22%, 38% and 35%, respectively. In that 
same report, there is a growth prediction of 12% in 
the consumption of beef and pork and 24% in poul-
try consumption. Regarding trade, according to FAO 
data (2018b), the global meat import value registered 
in recent years (2010-2013), represents 5% of the global 
agriculture imports. Of this total, 40% is beef, 32% poul-
try, and 26% pork. This section has the objective of iden-
tifying the top players in this market, in a way to stress 
the significance of this study’s topic for the Brazilian 
economy, as well as identifying the importance of the 
countries that use special safeguard for meat products.
Figure 1 shows the major frozen beef exporters and 
importers for the most recent years. Figures 2 and 3 
show this same profile, but for poultry and pork, respec-
tively. As may be observed in these figures, Brazil stands 
out as the largest global exporter of beef and poultry, 
and one of the top in pork. It is verified in Figure 1(b) 
that the U.S., China2, Russia, Japan and EU are the top 
2 The data from China correspond to the sum of the values of Hong 
Kong, Continental China, Macao and Taiwan. 
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beef importers. Due to geographic proximity, the North-
American market should be the most important for Bra-
zil. However, according to USITC (2018), in the entire 
period analyzed, the United States imported 49% of 
beef from Australia and 36% from New Zealand and no 
imports originating from Brazil. That distortion occurs 
due to the tariff rate quotas (TRQ) applied by the U.S. 
on the beef imports, as described in Table 1. Thus, this 
further stresses the importance of protectionist barriers 
applied in that market and the potential damage for Bra-
zilian exports.
In the poultry market, Brazil also stands out as a 
global exporter (Fig. 2a). The top importers, described 
in Figure 2b are: Japan, China, Saudi Arabia and the 
EU. As for the pork market, the European Union (EU), 
the U.S. and Canada detain a higher share than Brazil 
in global export value (Fig. 3a). Among the top import-
ers are Japan, China, Russia and the U.S. (Fig. 3b). This 
picture of these meats’ global trades, which are the most 
commercialized and consumed in the world, demon-
strates not only the importance of Brazilian exports 
but also the importance of importing countries that 
adopt trade barriers. Table 1 describes the products and 
the top importing markets, indicating which of them 
used tariff quotas (TRQ) and applied additional tariffs 
from the special safeguards mechanism (SSG) on their 
imports during the period of 1995, when these mecha-
nisms were introduced, up to the latest notifications, 
which refer to 2015. Table 1 shows that most of the rel-
evant importers do apply tariff quotas and have a right 
to apply an additional tariff due to the SSG.
China, another market that has been prominent in 
the imports of some of these products, especially pork 
and poultry, does not apply TRQ or SSG for these prod-
ucts. However, China Taipei has a TRQ and right of use 
of SSG for these products. Despite the meat TRQ in this 
country being as a simple tariff, since the intra and extra 
quota tariffs are the same, there have been notifications 
of SSG use in these products for several years. As it is 
not possible to distinguish the imports of China from 
Tab. 1. Use of tariff quota mechanisms (TRQ) and special safe-
guards (SSG) in the main meat and dairy importing markets, in the 
period from 1995 to 2015.
  European Union
United 
States Japan Canada Russia
Beef TRQ TRQ / SSG - TRQ TRQ
Poultry TRQ / SSG - - TRQ TRQ
Pork TRQ - - - TRQ
Source: WTO (2018a e b).
Fig. 1. Values, in USD, exported by the top global exporters and 
importers of frozen beef in the period between 2011 and 2013.
(a)   Top global exporters
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Source: Prepared by the authors, based on FAO (2018b).
Fig. 2. Values of poultry trade by the top global exporters and 
importers, in USD, for the period between 2011 and 2013.
(a)   Top global exporters
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Source: Prepared by the authors, based on FAO (2018b).
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those of China Taipei, according to the data available in 
United States (2018), it is worth noting that in this mar-
ket as well there are high levels of protectionist barriers 
from these mechanisms that could have been put into 
practice.
The SSG is still a protectionist mechanism that lacks 
analyses in terms of its impact. Given the relevance of 
the meat market for Brazil and the use of this protec-
tion mechanism in markets of major relevance in their 
imports, this study sought to evaluate the impact of 
additional SSG tariff use in the main meat importing 
markets. The entire period during which this mecha-
nism has been in place was analyzed, since 1996 until 
the latest notifications registered with the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), in 2015. The analyses carried out 
in this study, therefore, focused on the countries and 
products described in Table 1 that applied the addition-
al tariff from the SSG and estimated their impacts, by 
means of the export level that would have been achieved 
if they had not been applied. The following section 
describes the methods and data used in this analysis.
3. METHOD AND DATA 
This section presents the theory and method used 
to estimate the impact of the additional SSG mechanism 
applied on trade. Considering that the application of 
the additional SSG tariff should be obligatorily notified 
in a document with the WTO, the first stage consisted 
in identifying their application in this database (WTO, 
2018a). The notifications indicate the tariff line affected 
and the year for each country. In parallel, the main tariff 
lines (TL) used on meat imports in the markets analyzed 
were identified for United States and European Union 
in the period 1995-2015. These data were obtained from 
Eurostat (2018) and USITC (2018). The SSG notification 
does not present the additional tariff value. Therefore, at 
second stage of the study an estimate of the additional 
tariff value is obtained.
The additional tariff depends on the nature of the 
SSG applied, i.e. if it was on volume or price. In the 
case of meat exports, the price-based SSG was the most 
important. As previously described, for the volume-
based SSG, the additional tariff could be any value up to 
33% of the tariff applied. For the price-based SSG there 
is a rule that was used to obtain estimates in this study. 
The rule is that if the import price falls below a cer-
tain limit, defined as a price trigger, in a value less than 
or equal to 10% of that trigger, no additional tariff is 
imposed; if the difference is within 10% and 40% of the 
trigger price, the additional tariff is 30% of the amount 
at which the difference has exceeded the 10% of the trig-
ger price; if the difference is within 40% and 60% of the 
trigger price, the previous account is summed with an 
additional tariff of 50% of the amount at which the dif-
ference exceeds the 40% of the trigger price; if the dif-
ference is within 60% and 75% of the trigger price, the 
additional tariff is 70% of the amount at which the dif-
ference exceeds the 60% of the trigger price, summed to 
the increments described in previous intervals. Finally, 
if the mentioned difference is beyond 75% of the trigger 
price, the additional tax will be 90% of the amount at 
which the difference has exceeded the 75% of the trigger 
price, plus the integral increments corresponding to the 
previous intervals (FAO, 2002). 
Therefore, it is verified that for these calculations, 
the import prices should also be identified. An average 
import unit value of the country in the year of applica-
tion was used as a proxy, obtained by dividing the val-
ue and volume of imports of each tariff line, using data 
obtained from the sources: Eurostat (2018) and USITC 
(2018). Nonetheless, when there is a notification of SSG 
use and the identified price is not below 10% of the trig-
ger price, we adopted a reference price from other major 
global importers, obtained from United States (2018). 
Once the values of the additional tariffs were esti-
mated for each year in which their use was notified, 
we use an economic formula to estimate the trade 
gains deriving from the price change. This formula is 
described in equation (1).
Fig. 3. Values of frozen pork trade by the top global exporters and 
importers, in USD, for the period between 2011 and 2013.
(a)   Top global exporters




























EU (exc intra-trade) U.S. Canada Brazil China Mexico
Source: Prepared by the authors, based on FAO (2018b).
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∆M =ηM *∆P *MBASE  (1)
where M is the imported volume; P is the price paid 
by domestic consumers; ηM is the import price elas-
ticity; and ∆  represents a percentage variation. Thus, 
∆P = Pf − Pi( )/Pi . MBASE is the quantum imported, con-
sidering the initial price Pi), i.e. the price paid by the 
consumer before a change in the import tariff, which 
directly impacts that price.
Considering that the variation is caused by the 
change in the country’s import tariff, equation (1) can be 
rewritten as described in equation (2). Since it is neces-
sary to use all tariffs imposed on the product, extra-quo-
ta tariffs were also considered in addition to the addi-
tional tariff. Thus, Ti is the initial import tariff, which 
represents the extra-quota tariff plus the additional SSG 






The import tariff is given in percentage terms of the 
price of the imported product. In the case that the tar-
iff is specific or mixed, the tariff equivalent was annually 
estimated, considering the same import price used to 
estimate the SSG for each year, or the country’s annual 
average import price.
The value of the import price elasticity ηM ), in turn, 
depends on the product’s domestic demand ηd) and sup-
ply ηs) elasticities, as well as the ratio of the volume con-
sumed (D) and produced (S) with the imported quan-
tum (M). Equation (3) describes the formula to obtain 
the import demand price elasticity3.
ηM =ηd * D
M
−η s * S
M  (3)
The elasticity data was obtained from Fapri (2018) 
and the domestic consumption and production data 
from FAO (2018).
By knowing the volume that was not imported due 
to the application of the SSG in each year, a part of this 
volume was adopted as potentially being supplied by 
Brazil. The percentage used to calculate the exports that 
Brazil ended up not sending to that country was based 
on the percentage that Brazilian exports XBR) of that 
product group had within global exports XW), in each 
3 The derivative of this equation can be found in Orcutt (1950).
year of the analysis. By multiplying the volume that 
the country ended up not exporting by the basic price 
(received by the producer - Pb) we obtain for each year 
an estimate of the value of the country’s exports losses 
(y). Equation (4) describes this calculation. It can also be 
verified in this equation that, despite the variations in 
imports and Brazil’s participation have been estimated 
year by year, the value that was not exported was cal-
culated for the entire period analyzed (the subscribed 
“t” indicates the year analyzed). This was done so this 
value could be placed as a total impact to estimate oth-
















*Pb = y  (4)
The value of y was then used as a demand shock 
(demand that did not occur) on the input-output matrix 
of the country. This relationship between demand shock 
and the impact on the economy can be obtained from 
equation (5), as described by Miller & Blair (2009). 
In this equation, the variable Y represents a demand 
matrix, where the value of exports that did not occur 
is entered4; X is the matrix that describes the impact of 
that demand on the production value of the entire econ-
omy and matrix (A) represents the technical relation in 
the intermediary demand.
X = (I – A)-1Y (5) 
The impacts (X) estimated in this manner indi-
cate the direct and indirect effects on the economy, also 
called type I multipliers. Type II multipliers were also 
obtained as type I plus the effect of a consumer income 
variation caused by the direct and indirect effects. In 
order to obtain type II multipliers, the matrix A of tech-
nical coefficients includes “families” as if it was another 
sector of the economy. The new matrix is described  A .
In addition to the impacts on the production val-
ue, the impacts on the value of remunerations (ZR), 
of imports (ZM), of the number of jobs (ZE) and of the 
Gross Domestic Product (ZGDP) were also estimated. For 
such, the result obtained from equation (5) was used to 
obtain the estimates described in equation (6).
Z(nx1),k =[diagonalized(C(nx1),k)](nxn),k * Xnx1 (6)
4 The difference between y and Y is a value and Y is a vector-type matrix 
where, in the line corresponding to the meats sector that was not 
exported by the country, the value y found is included.
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Where k = R (remunerations value), M (imports 
value), GDP (GDP value) and E (number of people 
employed). The Ck coefficients were obtained at the actu-
al input-output matrix.
The input-output matrix used in this study was esti-
mated based on the data from the Brazilian National 
Accounts (Brazil, 2018) as described by Guilhoto and 
Sesso (2010) and Guilhoto and Sesso (2005). The produc-
tive structure, in terms of the value and the coefficients 
used, which were the structures required to obtain the 
results, refer to that observed in the country in 2013.
4. RESULTS
As described in section 2, the analysis made in this 
study focused on the countries and products described 
in Table 2, which made use of the SSG in the meat mar-
ket. They are: the U.S. in the imports of beef and EU in 
imports of poultry. The additional SSG tariff is applied 
over the extra-quota tariff value. The extra-quota tar-
iff applied in the U.S. on beef is 26.4%5. In the case of 
EU, there are mixed tariffs. In order to estimate an 
equivalent ad valorem value (EAV) of the mixed tariffs, 
it should be taken into account that their EAV changes 
depending on the import price reference. Figure 4 shows 
the EAVs calculated for the poultry extra-quota tariff in 
the EU for each year, using the average import price of 
each one of them. It may be observed in Figure 4 how 
the tariff equivalents change their protection level while 
changing the product price reference. In that sense, it is 
verified that a higher level of tariff protection is observed 
for lower price levels, which means increasing the pro-
tection in periods of global excess supply, which in 
turn also contributes to the even higher increase in this 
excess, causing a snowball-type effect. The same ration-
ale applies to the impact of special price safeguards, 
whose additional tariff increases as the product import 
price decreases. 
In order to make a comparison between the prod-
ucts’ protection level, we therefore consider that in 
the EU, depending on the import price used, the EAV 
remained between: 50-70% for poultry; 70-90% for beef; 
and 25-30% for pork. 
Despite indicating only one tariff for an entire prod-
uct group, we actually have several tariff lines (TL), often 
with different tariffs, for each type of meat. The tar-
iff described and used in this study in each group rep-
resents the most relevant TL in the country’s imports. 
Likewise, for each of those products, in each country, we 
5 The extra-quota tariff applied in the U.S. on beef imported by Australia 
is lower (21.1%) than the others.
have some TLs where the SSG was applied. For the prod-
ucts analyzed, it was observed that the price SSGs were 
the most active and that there were nine tariff lines that 
stood out when observing their application: one TL in 
the U.S. (tariff line 02023010 and 02023080 – beef, fro-
zen, intra and extra quota, respectively) and eight poul-
try TLs in the EU (they are: 02071290 – whole frozen 
chicken; 02071410 – boneless chicken, frozen; 02071450 
– chicken breast, with bones, frozen; 02071460 – chicken 
legs, with bones, frozen; 02071470 – other chicken parts, 
with bones, frozen; 02072510 – whole turkey, frozen; 
02072710 – turkey cuts, frozen and; 02073615 – duck or 
goose meat, frozen)6. This was the universe analyzed in 
this study7. 
Figure 4 shows the estimated values of the addition-
al price-based SSG tariffs for this set of nine TLs that 
used this mechanism, along with the extra quota tariff 
applied at each year, for the period from 1996 to 2015. 
Since the price SSG is applied per ship and there is no 
way to identify the cargo’s import price on which it was 
applied, the analyses were performed with average annu-
al prices. The average extra quota import price was used 
(only the U.S. indicate the intra and extra quota imports 
separately), for it is on the extra quota imports that 
the SSG incurs. However, in the cases where the coun-
try declared use of SSG and the import price identified 
was not below the trigger price, a global import price 
was used for this estimate, as described in Section 3. 
For some TLs, however, it was observed that even using 
this resource for several years, despite the country hav-
ing notified the use of price SSG, import price levels low 
enough to warrant an SSG activation were not found. 
All years where there was a notification of SSG activa-
tion and the price observed did not corroborate with 
their use were marked in Figure 4 charts with a square. 
A larger price variation can occur during some years 
and justify the use of an SSG, since this study used an 
annual average price. But if that was the case, as dur-
ing most of the period analyzed, the use of a safeguard 
instrument wouldn’t be expected.
In those cases, since the import price is above the 
trigger price, as well as the global prices, it was not pos-
sible to estimate the corresponding additional tariffs. It 
6 In the period analyzed (1995-2015) these tariff lines underwent 
some transformations. Therefore: the TL 02071210 was 02072110; 
the TL 02071290 was 02072190; the TL 02071410 was 02074110; the 
TL 02071450 was 02074151; the TL 02071460 was 02074171; the TL 
02071470 was 02074171; the tariff line 02072510 was 02072210; the TL 
02072710 was 02073931 and; the TL 02073615 was 02074515 and also 
02074315.
7 Japan, despite not having a tariff quota for pork meat, submitted a vol-
ume SSG usage notification for this product in 1997. This data was not 
estimated and stands as a mere observation in this study.
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is verified that this was more severe for beef in the U.S. 
This observation, which did not occur in an isolated 
manner, but persistently within the application of more 
significant special safeguards on the global meat trade, 
raises doubts whether the SSGs are really being applied 
within import price conditions below the trigger, and 
not only considering normal annual price variations. In 
that case, even reforms to this mechanism could fail to 
be effective to reduce the protection levels.
As previously mentioned, it is also verified in Figure 
4 that the EAV extra quota tariff changes throughout the 
years, since different price levels are observed each year. 
Figure 5 shows the volumes imported each year 
and the estimated volumes, calculated as described in 
equation (2), which were no longer imported due to the 
application of SSG. Since the import price elasticity is 
responsible for a significant share in the results, they are 
described in Figure 6. These values were calculated as 
presented in equation (3).
As expected, the estimated volume which was not 
imported due to the SSG is directly proportional to the 
scale of the additional tariff estimated and described in 
Figure. 4. However, the basic imported volume, which 
is the volume imported in the year of the SSG applica-
tion is also important for this estimate, and the mag-
nitude of the values, which can be observed in the axes 
of the charts in Figure 5, draws attention to this fact. 
The magnitude of the impact on the imported volume 
is observed in Figure 5(a) and 3(b) as quite superior 
to the others, indicating their greater significance for 
trade. Figure 5(a), which has the greatest import magni-
tude among the tariff lines analyzed, represents the SSG 
impact on beef imports in the U.S.
And, as presented above, this effect could only be 
estimated for the years 1999 and 2000, despite the U.S. 
having notified the use of SSG in all years up to 2015. 
Since this is a very large market, the magnitude of the 
impacts that could not be estimated, therefore, could be 
important for the global meats market. If we consider 
the impacts of beef and poultry reduction in the years of 
1999 and 2000 due to the SSG estimated in this study, 
this value represents approximately 2.5 and 1.5% of the 
global trade of these meats, respectively, in the years 
1999 and 2000. As for the other years, where only the 
Fig. 4. Equivalent Ad Valorem tariff (EAV) estimated for the extra quota and additional tariff estimate from the use of price SSGs for the 
tariff lines analyzed, using the average annual price data for imports in the period 1996 to 2015.
(a)   Frozen beef, in the U.S. (b)   Boneless chicken, frozen, in the EU (c)   Whole chicken, frozen, in the EU
(d)   Chicken breast with bones, frozen, in the EU (e)   Chicken legs, with bones, frozen, in the EU (f)   Other chicken parts, with bones, frozen, in the EU
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Aditional tariff due to SSG
Equivalent Ad Valorem (EAV) tariff
Source: Prepared by the authors based on data from WTO (2018a and b), USITC (2018), United (2018) and Eurostat (2018).
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impacts on poultry were measured, the participation of 
these impacts in the global poultry market varied from 
1.6% in 2003 to 0.1% in 2001, with an average of 0.5% 
for the period (except the years 1999 and 2000). These 
results also depend on the price elasticities considered. 
Applying Brazil’s participation in global exports of 
beef and chicken on each of the years studied for the 
estimated volumes that were not imported due to SSG 
application, we obtain an estimate of Brazilian exports 
that did not occur. Brazil’s participation in beef trade 
varied from less than 10%, before 2000, to 20% from the 
mid-2000s decade. As for the poultry market, Brazilian 
participation was of 15% until the decade of 2000, and 
reached the threshold of approximately 35% from then 
on. By multiplying them by the basic prices of these 
products, which were obtained in Brazil’s Input-Output 
Matrix of 2013, we obtain the demand shock values esti-
mated for the Brazilian economy. The values of these 
shocks were approximately BRL 517 million for poultry 
and BRL 287 million for beef. Table 2 shows the results 
obtained from the impact of these values on the Brazil-
ian economy.
The first observation about the results refers to the 
relatively low impact found in this study of the meat 
market when compared to those obtained for the sugar 
market (Costa et al., 2015). In the latter, the impact in 
the period of 1995-2013 was approximately BRL 42 bil-
lion in gross production value (VBP) of the Brazilian 
economy and in the former, for an additional period 
of two years, from 1995-2015, the impact was less than 
BRL 4 billion in the VBP. Nonetheless, the trigger prices 
to activate SSG in sugar were quite high in regard to the 
prices practiced in the period, resulting in high levels 
of an additional tariff applied and, consequently, in the 
high impacts observed by Costa et al. (2015). In the case 
of meat, the trigger price was clearly higher only for one 
of the tariff lines analyzed (Boneless chicken, frozen, in 
the EU). As may be observed in the charts in Figure 4 
and 5, most of the impacts could not be estimated due 
to prices observed above the trigger price. But in face 
of the fact that SSG applications were notified for those 
products and years, much of the impact certainly could 
not have been estimated in this study. This observation 
could be more important in this study than the impacts 
Fig. 5. Import volumes observed and estimate of what was not imported due to the application of an additional special safeguard tariff, 
applied by the U.S. and EU in the meats market, period 1996 to 2015.
(a)   Frozen beef, in the U.S. (b)   Boneless chicken, frozen, in the EU (c)   Whole chicken, frozen, in the EU
(d)   Chicken breast with bones, frozen, in the EU (e)   Chicken legs, with bones, frozen, in the EU (f)   Other chicken parts, with bones, frozen, in the EU
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Increase in imports without SSG
Imports
Source: Prepared by the authors based on data from WTO (2018a and b), USITC (2018), United (2018) and Eurostat (2018).
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estimated to show the relevance of minding the use of 
this mechanism.
The type I estimated impacts - which correspond 
to the direct and indirect effects of a demand shock, 
in addition to the actual sector that received the shock 
– were higher in the following sectors presented in 
decreasing order of impact: Other food products, Live-
stock, Trade. These sectors were the most impacted by 
the direct and indirect effects in all variables analyzed: 
production, GDP, remuneration/salary, employment and 
importation. However, as may be observed in Table 2, 
the impact of a growth in imports was quite small. This 
is a good result for the country’s economy, for it is veri-
fied that the shock does not demand much from sectors 
highly dependent on imported products in the country.
It is verified that the impact with only the income 
effect, which is the difference between Type II and Type 
I impacts, represents an important portion of the total 
impact, corresponding to approximately 36% for GPV 
variables and number of jobs, and 47% for the remain-
ing variables. Thus, while separating the income effect 
of the type II impact, we observe that the sectors most 
affected by this effect are different depending on the var-
iable analyzed. Considering the gross production value 
(GPV), in addition to the actual sector that received the 
shock, the most impacted sectors in order of significance 
were: Trade, Real estate activities, Oil refining, Other 
food products, Food and Agriculture. In turn, consider-
ing the income effect of the impact on the GDP, the Real 
estate sector’s activities were superior to those of Trade, 
followed by the sectors of Food and Agriculture. How-
ever, observing the impacts on employment, few sectors 
were relevant, with the following sectors standing out 
in this order: Trade,Livestock, Food, and Agriculture. 
Despite having a much lower impact than on those sec-
tors, but still quite superior to the average of the coun-
try’s sectors, and due to the income effect of the coun-
try’s meat exports growth, the following sectors stood 
out in job creation: Associative organizations and per-
sonal services, Private education and Private health care.
5. CONCLUSION
The results illustrate how a trade protection mech-
anism, such as SSG – for which there are few analy-
ses, and that should have been eliminated for having a 
transient character when adopted - presents expressive 
impacts on international meat trade and for the econo-
my of a country that exports such products, as Brazil.
The use of special safeguards (SSG) for agricultural 
products has been an instrument with a high poten-
tial to enable increases in the consolidated tariffs at the 
WTO by member countries. Thus, it gains importance, 
mainly at periods of high relative supply of products and 
Fig. 6. Values of the price elasticity of demand for imports (η^M) 




















































Bovine meat - U.S.
Poultry meat - EU
Note: *The same value of the last year was considered due to the 
lack of data; is the demand price elasticity and the price elasticity of 
supply, both domestic, used as a basis to estimate the demand for 
imports.
Source: FAO (2018a); Fapri (2018).
Tab. 2. Estimated impact on the Brazilian economy of a demand shock in Brazilian meat exports: BRL 517 million for poultry and BRL 287 
million for beef. Values in BRL million, at 2015 prices (for the “Job” variable, the results indicate number of people).
  Gross Production Value (GPV)
Number of people 
employed GDP Remuneration Importation
Type I*
Beef 817 9.721 344 120 31
Poultry 1.472 17.511 620 216 56
Type II*
Beef 1.339 15.139 653 226 58
Poultry 2.411 27.272 1.176 407 104
Note: *Type I corresponds to the direct and indirect impacts and Type II to the impacts, besides those, also of the income effect.
Source: Research results.
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reduced prices in the international market. In fact, when 
the prices of the international market are reduced, that 
increases the imported product’s competitiveness in the 
importer country markets. With the reaction of these 
importers in the form of higher tariffs by the percent-
age provided in the agreements, there is a reduction in 
imports that increases an excess of the global supply, 
particularly when the countries that react are significant 
importers. As a result, prices could end up even lower in 
the international market. This characterizes a perverse 
effect associated to the deployment of SSGs, reinforcing 
the importance of measuring and analyzing its effects, as 
presented in this study. 
It is worth noting that the transparency of the meas-
urements for their evaluation could be improved, since 
the countries don’t need to inform the value of the 
imposed tariff when notifying its application. Today, 
importers are only required to notify that they are using 
the SSG measure. Another aspect involves the fact that 
the price-based SSG is applied per ship, which also 
makes it difficult to obtain the actual cargo import price 
on which it was applied. An approximation consists in 
employing average annual prices for the commodity. 
Given such procedure cannot provide the exact value, 
there are cases in which the country declares the use of 
SSG and the actual import price calculated is not lower 
than the trigger price. Therefore, the results obtained 
can be underestimated, and it is important to analyze 
the results obtained with that reservation. This was iden-
tified, for example, in the case of the U.S. meats market. 
In that market, this effect could only be estimated for 
the years 1999 and 2000, despite the U.S. having notified 
the use of SSGs in all years up to 2015. Since it is a very 
large market, the magnitude of the impacts could not 
be estimated, therefore, they could be important for the 
global meats market and were not collected.
Despite these reservations, the results obtained in 
this study can subsidize future trade negotiations at the 
WTO. In addition, the study offers an analytic instru-
ment that may be updated in a simple manner, providing 
a way to monitor the changes throughout different peri-
ods of time. 
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